

Quantifying Masking Fault-Tolerance via Fair Stochastic Games

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EXPRESS/SOS 2023



Motivation: a memory cell

```
module NOMINAL

  b : [0..1] init 0;
  m : [0..1] init 0; // 0 = normal,
                      // 1 = refreshing

  [w0]  (m=0)      -> (b'= 0);
  [w1]  (m=0)      -> (b'= 1);
  [r0]  (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1]  (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
  [tick] (m=0)      -> p: (m'= 1) +
                        (1-p): true;
  [rfsh] (m=1)      -> (m'= 0);

endmodule
```

```
module FAULTY

  v : [0..3] init 0;
  s : [0..2] init 0; // 0 = normal, 1 = faulty,
                      // 2 = refreshing

  [w0]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 0) & (s'= 0);
  [w1]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 3) & (s'= 0);
  [r0]  (s!=2) & (v<=1) -> true;
  [r1]  (s!=2) & (v>=2) -> true;
  [tick] (s!=2)      -> p: (s'= 2) + q: (s'= 1)
                        + (1-p-q): true;
  [rfsh] (s=2)       -> (s'=0)
                        & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v<3) ? (v+1) : 2)
                        & (s'= 0);
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
                        & (s'= 0);

endmodule
```

Motivation: a memory controller

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Nominal model:

Prescribes the normal behavior
where faults do not occur

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```

Implementation model:
Includes faults and fault handling mechanism

Motivation: a memory controller

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endmodule
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Implementation model:
Includes faults and fault handling mechanism

Implementation model:

Implementation: a memory controller

How "close" is the implementation model to the nominal model?

```
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                          & (s'= 0);
    [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
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

endmodule
```

We want a general technique in contraposition with *ad-hoc* techniques

Implementation model:
Includes faults and fault handling mechanism

Probabilistic Masking Simulation: when implementations are perfect

For non-faulty
actions






So far, this is the usual
probabilistic bisimulation

exists a **coupling** w s.t.
 $w(s', t') > 0 \Rightarrow (s', t') \in R$

a distribution in $S \times S$ s.t.
 $w(\cdot, S) = \mu$ and $w(S, \cdot) = \nu$

Probabilistic Masking Simulation: when implementations are perfect

For non-faulty
actions






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 $w(\cdot, S) = \mu$ and $w(S, \cdot) = \nu$

where F is a fault

Probabilistic Masking Simulation: when implementations are perfect

For non-faulty
actions



exists a coupling w s.t.
 $w(s', t') > 0 \Rightarrow (s', t') \in R$

a distribution in $S \times S$ s.t.
 $w(\cdot, S) = \mu$ and $w(S, \cdot) = \nu$

The set $\mathbb{C}(\mu, \nu)$ of all
couplings forms a polytope
with vertices $\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{C}(\mu, \nu))$

Probabilistic Masking Simulation: when implementations are perfect

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  [r0]  (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1]  (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
  [tick] (m=0)       -> p: (m'= 1) +
                         (1-p): true;
  [rfsh] (m=1)      -> (m'= 0);

endmodule
```



```
module FAULTY
  v : [0..3] init 0;
  s : [0..2] init 0; // 0 = normal, 1 = faulty,
                      // 2 = refreshing
  f : [0..1] init 0; // fault limiting artifact

  [w0]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 0) & (s'= 0);
  [w1]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 3) & (s'= 0);
  [r0]  (s!=2) & (v<=1) -> true;
  [r1]  (s!=2) & (v>=2) -> true;
  [tick] (s!=2)      -> p: (s'= 2) + q: (s'= 1)
                         + (1-p-q): true;
  [rfsh] (s=2)        -> (s'=0)
                         & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
  [fault] (s=1) & (f<1) -> (v'= (v<3) ? (v+1) : 2)
                           & (s'= 0) & (f'= f+1);
  [fault] (s=1) & (f<1) -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
                           & (s'= 0) & (f'= f+1);

endmodule
```


$$R = \{ \langle (b, m), (v, s, f) \rangle \mid 2b \leq v \leq 2b+1 \wedge (m = 1 \Leftrightarrow s = 2) \}$$

Probabilistic Masking Simulation: when implementations are perfect

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                         & (s'= 0) ;
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                         & (s'= 0) ;

endmodule
```

A characterizing stochastic game

1. The refuter $\textcolor{red}{R}$ chooses either $\begin{cases} s \xrightarrow{a} \mu \text{ from the nominal model or} \\ s' \xrightarrow{a'} \mu' \text{ from the implementation;} \end{cases}$
- 2a. If $a \notin \mathcal{F}$, the verifier $\textcolor{red}{V}$ chooses $\begin{cases} s' \xrightarrow{a'} \mu' \text{ if } \textcolor{red}{R} \text{ chose from the nominal, or} \\ s \xrightarrow{a} \mu \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases}$
In addition, $\textcolor{red}{V}$ chooses a coupling w for $\mathbb{C}(\mu, \mu')$;
- 2b. If $a \in \mathcal{F}$, $\textcolor{red}{V}$ can only select Δ_s and the only coupling $w \in \mathbb{C}(\Delta_s, \mu')$;
3. The successor pair of states (t, t') is chosen probabilistically according to w .

If the play continues forever, $\textcolor{red}{V}$ wins and there is a probabilistic masking simulation

A characterizing stochastic game

1. The refuter \mathbf{R} chooses either $\begin{cases} s \xrightarrow{a} \mu \text{ from the nominal model or} \\ s' \xrightarrow{a'} \mu' \text{ from the implementation;} \end{cases}$
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In addition, \mathbf{V} chooses a coupling w for $\mathbb{C}(\mu, \mu')$;

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
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                        (1-p): true;
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endmodule

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endmodule

```



Stochastic masking
game graph

A characterizing stochastic game

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In addition, **V** chooses a coupling w for $\mathbb{C}(\mu, \mu')$;

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
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```



Uncountable
branching since
 $w_0 \in \mathbb{C}(\mu, \mu')$

Stochastic masking game graph

A characterizing stochastic game



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
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
Probabilistic masking simulation
iff

$$\sup_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R} \inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}(\diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 0$$



A characterizing stochastic game


A symbolic (finite!) alternative



A characterizing stochastic game

A symbolic (finite!) alternative

$$\begin{aligned}
 &x_{(0,1),(0,2)} + x_{(0,1),(0,1)} + x_{(0,1),(0,0)} = p \\
 &x_{(0,0),(0,2)} + x_{(0,0),(0,1)} + x_{(0,0),(0,0)} = 1 - p \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,2)} + x_{(0,0),(0,2)} = p \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,0)} + x_{(0,0),(0,0)} = 1 - p - q \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,1)} + x_{(0,0),(0,1)} = q \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,2)} \geq 0 \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,1)} \geq 0 \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,0)} \geq 0 \\
 &x_{(0,0),(0,2)} \geq 0 \\
 &x_{(0,0),(0,1)} \geq 0 \\
 &x_{(0,0),(0,0)} \geq 0
 \end{aligned}$$



A characterizing stochastic game


A symbolic (finite!) alternative

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 &x_{(0,1),(0,2)} + x_{(0,1),(0,1)} + x_{(0,1),(0,0)} = p \\
 &x_{(0,0),(0,2)} + x_{(0,0),(0,1)} + x_{(0,0),(0,0)} = 1 - p \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,2)} + x_{(0,0),(0,2)} = p \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,0)} + x_{(0,0),(0,0)} = 1 - p - q \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,1)} + x_{(0,0),(0,1)} = q \\
 &x_{(0,1),(0,2)} \geq 0
 \end{aligned}$$

The stochastic game can be solved using the symbolic game using the limit of:

$$U^0 = \{v_{\text{err}}\}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 U^{i+1} = &\{v' \mid v' \in V_R^{\mathcal{SG}} \wedge \text{Post}^{\mathcal{SG}}(v') \cap (\bigcup_{j \leq i} U^j) \neq \emptyset\} \cup \\
 &\{v' \mid v' \in V_V^{\mathcal{SG}} \wedge \text{Post}^{\mathcal{SG}}(v') \subseteq \bigcup_{j \leq i} U^j\} \cup \\
 &\{v' \mid v' \in V_P^{\mathcal{SG}} \wedge \text{Eq}(v', \text{Post}^{\mathcal{SG}}(v') \cap (\bigcup_{j \leq i} U^j)) \text{ has no solution}\}
 \end{aligned}$$



If not masking similar, how close it is?


Instead, we consider quantitative objectives:

- ❖ Expected total accumulated **milestones**

$$m : \Sigma_{\mathcal{F}} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$$

- ❖ The **reward** is defined by

$$r_m(v) = \begin{cases} m(\sigma) & \text{if } v \text{ is a } \textcolor{red}{V} \text{ node} \\ & \text{and } \sigma \text{ the action in it} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



$m(\text{tick}) = 1$
 $m(a) = 0, \text{ if } a \neq \text{tick}$

If not, usually

$$\sup_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R} \inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} (\Diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 1$$

Probabilistic masking simulation

iff

$$\sup_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R} \inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} (\Diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 0$$

v_{err}

If not masking similar, how close it is?

Instead, we consider quantitative objectives:

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- ❖ We want to optimize


$$\mathbb{E}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}[f_m]$$

where

$$f_m(v_0 v_1 v_2 v_3 \dots) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} (\sum_{i=0}^n r_m(v_i))$$

Expected total reward

masking payoff function



$$m(\text{tick}) = 1$$

$$m(a) = 0, \text{ if } a \neq \text{tick}$$

If not, usually

$$\sup_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R} \inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}(\Diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 1$$

Probabilistic masking simulation iff

$$\sup_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R} \inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}(\Diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 0$$

If not masking similar, how close it is?

In our context:
almost surely failing

Instead, we consider π_V, π_R objectives:

- ❖ Expected total accumulated milestones
- ❖ $m(v) = \sum_{\sigma} r_m(v)$
To solve it, the game needs to be **stopping**: for all pair of strategies the probability of reaching v_{err} is 1


$$r_m(v) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v = \text{milestone} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- ❖ We want to optimize

$$\mathbb{E}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}[f_m]$$

where

$$f_m(v_0 v_1 v_2 v_3 \dots) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} (\sum_{i=0}^n r_m(v_i))$$



$m(\text{tick}) = 1$
 $m(a) = 0, \text{ if } a \neq \text{tick}$

If not, usually
 $\sup_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R} \inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}(\Diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 1$

masking payoff function

Probabilistic masking simulation
iff
 $\sup_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R} \inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}(\Diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 0$

The need of fairness

```
module NOMINAL

b : [0..1] init 0;
m : [0..1] init 0; // 0 = normal,
                    // 1 = refreshing

[w0] (m=0)      -> (b'= 0);
[w1] (m=0)      -> (b'= 1);
[r0] (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
[r1] (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
[tick] (m=0)     -> p: (m'= 1) +
                      (1-p): true;
[rfsh] (m=1)     -> (m'= 0);

endmodule
```

```
module FAULTY

v : [0..3] init 0;
s : [0..2] init 0; // 0 = normal, 1 = faulty,
                    // 2 = refreshing

[w0] (s!=2)      -> (v'= 0) & (s'= 0);
[w1] (s!=2)      -> (v'= 3) & (s'= 0);
[r0] (s!=2) & (v<=1) -> true;
[r1] (s!=2) & (v>=2) -> true;
[tick] (s!=2)    -> p: (s'= 2) + q: (s'= 1)
                      + (1-p-q): true;
[rfsh] (s=2)      -> (s'=0)
                      & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
[fault] (s=1)    -> (v'= (v<3) ? (v+1) : 2)
                      & (s'= 0) ;
[fault] (s=1)    -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
                      & (s'= 0) ;

endmodule
```

The need of fairness

```
module NOMINAL
  b : [0..1] init 0;
  m : [0..1] init 0; // 0 = normal,
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  [w0]  (m=0)      -> (b'= 0);
  [w1]  (m=0)      -> (b'= 1);
  [r0]  (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1]  (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
  [tick] (m=0)      -> p: (m'= 1) +
                         (1-p): true;
  [rfsh] (m=1)      -> (m'= 0);

endmodule
```

R chooses to read

```
module FAULTY
  v : [0..3] init 0;
  s : [0..2] init 0; // 0 = normal, 1 = faulty,
                      // 2 = refreshing

  [w0]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 0) & (s'= 0);
  [w1]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 3) & (s'= 0);
  [r0]  (s!=2) & (v<=1) -> true;
  [r1]  (s!=2) & (v>=2) -> true;
  [tick] (s!=2)      -> p: (s'= 2) + q: (s'= 1)
                         + (1-p-q): true;
  [rfsh] (s=2)       -> (s'=0)
                         & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v<3) ? (v+1) : 2)
                         & (s'= 0);
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
                         & (s'= 0);

endmodule
```

The need of fairness

```
module NOMINAL
  b : [0..1] init 0;
  m : [0..1] init 0; // 0 = normal,
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  [w0]  (m=0)      -> (b'= 0);
  [w1]  (m=0)      -> (b'= 1);
  [r0]  (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1]  (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
  [tick] (m=0)      -> p: (m'= 1) +
                         (1-p): true;
  [rfsh] (m=1)      -> (m'= 0);
endmodule
```

```
module FAULTY
  v : [0..3] init 0;
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  [w0]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 0) & (s'= 0);
  [w1]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 3) & (s'= 0);
  [r0]  (s!=2) & (v<=1) -> true;
  [r1]  (s!=2) & (v>=2) -> true;
  [tick] (s!=2)      -> p: (s'= 2) + q: (s'= 1)
                         + (1-p-q): true;
  [rfsh] (s=2)       -> (s'=0)
                         & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
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```

V imitates with the
only choice

The need of fairness

```
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  [w1]  (m=0)      -> (b'= 1);
  [r0]  (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1]  (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
  [tick] (m=0)      -> p: (m'= 1) +
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  [rfsh] (m=1)      -> (m'= 0);

endmodule
```

R chooses to read

```
module FAULTY
  v : [0..3] init 0;
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  [w0]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 0) & (s'= 0);
  [w1]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 3) & (s'= 0);
  [r0]  (s!=2) & (v<=1) -> true;
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                         & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
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                         & (s'= 0);
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
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endmodule
```

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  [r0]  (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1]  (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
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                         (1-p): true;
  [rfsh] (m=1)      -> (m'= 0);
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```

```
module FAULTY
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  [w1]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 3) & (s'= 0);
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                         + (1-p-q): true;
  [rfsh] (s=2)       -> (s'=0)
                         & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v<3) ? (v+1) : 2)
                         & (s'= 0) ;
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
                         & (s'= 0) ;
endmodule
```

V imitates with the
only choice

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  [r0]  (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1]  (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
  [tick] (m=0)      -> p: (m'= 1) +
                         (1-p): true;
  [rfsh] (m=1)      -> (m'= 0);

endmodule
```

R chooses to read

```
module FAULTY
  v : [0..3] init 0;
  s : [0..2] init 0; // 0 = normal, 1 = faulty,
                      // 2 = refreshing

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  [w1]  (s!=2)      -> (v'= 3) & (s'= 0);
  [r0]  (s!=2) & (v<=1) -> true;
  [r1]  (s!=2) & (v>=2) -> true;
  [tick] (s!=2)      -> p: (s'= 2) + q: (s'= 1)
                         + (1-p-q): true;
  [rfsh] (s=2)       -> (s'=0)
                         & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v<3) ? (v+1) : 2)
                         & (s'= 0) ;
  [fault] (s=1)      -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
                         & (s'= 0) ;

endmodule
```

The need of fairness

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  [r0] (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1] (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
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                        (1-p): true;
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```

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  [tick] (s!=2)    -> p: (s'= 2) + q: (s'= 1)
                        + (1-p-q): true;
  [rfsh] (s=2)     -> (s'=0)
                      & (v'= (v<=1) ? 0 : 3);
  [fault] (s=1)    -> (v'= (v<3) ? (v+1) : 2)
                        & (s'= 0);
  [fault] (s=1)    -> (v'= (v>0) ? (v-1) : 1)
                        & (s'= 0);
endmodule
```

V imitates with the
only choice

We then request that the game is
almost sure failing *under fairness*

$$\inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R^f} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}(\diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 1$$

The need of fairness

```
module NOMINAL
  b : [0..1] init 0;
  m : [0..1] init 0; // 0 = normal,
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  [w0]   (m=0)      -> (b'= 0);
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  [r0]   (m=0) & (b=0) -> true;
  [r1]   (m=0) & (b=1) -> true;
  [tick] (m=0)       -> p: (m'= 1) +
                         (1-p): true;
  [rfsh] (m=1)       -> (m'= 0);
endmodule
```

We then request that the game is almost sure failing under fairness

$$\inf_{\pi_V \in \Pi_V} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_R^f} \text{Prob}^{\pi_V, \pi_R}(\diamond v_{\text{err}}) = 1$$

```
module FAULTY
  v : [0..3] init 0;
  s : [0..2] init 0; // 0 = normal, 1 = faulty,
                      // 2 = refreshing
```

[w0] (s!=2) -> ;
 [w1] (s!=2) -> ;
 [r0] (s!=2) & (v<=1) -> ;
 [r1] (s!=2) & (v>=2) -> ;
 [tick] (s!=2) -> p: (s'= 2) + q: (s'= 1)
 (1-p-q): true;
endmodule

...if the game is finite



In this more general case, stochastic games with expected total reward objectives are determined and can be solved [CAV 2022]

V imitates with the only choice

? 0 : 3;
-1) : 2;
;
(v-1) : 1;
;

Generalization to our infinite setting

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are determined and can be solved

Generalization to our infinite setting

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are **determined** and **can be solved**

$$\inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] = \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m]$$

Generalization to our infinite setting

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are **determined** and **can be solved**

$$\begin{aligned} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] &= \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,H}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,H}^{MD}} \mathbb{E}_{H,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] = \\ &= \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,H}^{MD}} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,H}^{MDf}} \mathbb{E}_{H,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] = \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \end{aligned}$$

Generalization to our infinite setting

Provided \mathcal{H} is almost sure failing under fairness

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are **determined** and **can be solved**

$$\begin{aligned} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] &= \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,\mathcal{H}}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,\mathcal{H}}^{MD}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{H},v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] = \\ &= \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,\mathcal{H}}^{MD}} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,\mathcal{H}}^{MDf}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{H},v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] = \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{H} is a **finite** stochastic game

Applies results in
[CAV 2022]

Generalization to our infinite setting

Provided \mathcal{H} is almost sure failing under fairness

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are **determined** and **can be solved**

$$\inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m]$$

Generalization to our infinite sett.

Provided \mathcal{H} is almost
sure failing under fairness

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are **determined** and **can be solved**

$$\inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m]$$
$$\leq \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m]$$

$$\Pi_{R,G}^{MDf} \subseteq \Pi_{R,G}^f$$

Memoryless
deterministic fair
strategies

Generalization to our infinite sett.

Provided \mathcal{H} is almost sure failing under fairness

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are determined and can be solved

$$\begin{aligned} & \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \\ & \leq \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \\ & = \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}^S} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \end{aligned}$$

Lemma: Fix $\pi_R \in \Pi_R^S$. For any $\pi_V \in \Pi_V$, there is a semi-Markov strategy $\pi_V^* \in \Pi_V^S$ s.t.

$$\mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] = \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V^*, \pi_R} [f_m]$$

Semi-Markov strategies

if $|\rho| = |\rho'|$ and
 $\text{last}(\rho) = \text{last}(\rho')$ then
 $\pi_V(\rho) = \pi_V(\rho')$

Generalization to our infinite setting

Provided \mathcal{H} is almost sure failing under fairness

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are determined and can be solved

$$\begin{aligned} & \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \\ & \leq \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}^S} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \\ & = \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}^{XS}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \end{aligned}$$

Lemma: Fix $\pi_R \in \Pi_R^S$. For any $\pi_V \in \Pi_V^S$ there is an **extreme semi-Markov strategy** $\pi_V^* \in \Pi_V^{XS}$ s.t.

$$\mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] = \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V^*, \pi_R} [f_m]$$

Extreme
semi-Markov
strategies

$\pi_V(\rho)((s, -, s', \mu, \mu', w, P)) > 0$
implies $w \in V(C(\mu, \mu'))$

Generalization to our infinite setting

Provided \mathcal{H} is almost sure failing under fairness

Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are determined and can be solved

$$\begin{aligned} & \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,\mathcal{G}}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,\mathcal{G}}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{G},v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \\ & \leq \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,\mathcal{G}}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,\mathcal{G}}^{XS}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{G},v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \\ & = \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,\mathcal{H}}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,\mathcal{H}}^S} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{H},v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \end{aligned}$$

Vertex snippet stochastic game graph:
 \mathcal{H} is the subgraph of \mathcal{G} with only probabilistic nodes
 $(s, -, s', \mu, \mu', w, P)$ with $w \in \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{C}(\mu, \mu'))$

Generalization to our infinite setting

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Theorem:

Stochastic masking games with masking payoff objectives are determined and can be solved

$$\begin{aligned} & \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \\ & \leq \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,H}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,H}^S} \mathbb{E}_{H,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \\ & = \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,H}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,H}^{MD}} \mathbb{E}_{H,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m] \end{aligned}$$

By Theorem 5 in
[CAV 2022]

Generalization to our infinite setting

Provided \mathcal{H} is almost sure failing under fairness

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By Lema 6 in
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Extreme semi-Markov strategies

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$$\Pi_{V,G}^{XMD} \subseteq \Pi_{V,G}$$

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Property **inf** and **sup**

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Theorem:

The game can be solved on the symbolic game graph using the following Bellman equations

$$x_v = \min \left(\mathbf{U}, \max_{w \in \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{C}(v[3], v[4]))} \sum_{v' \in Post(v)} w(v'[0], v'[2]) \cdot x_{v'} \right) \quad \text{if } v \in V_P^{SG}$$

$$x_v = \min (\mathbf{U}, r_m(v) + \max \{x_{v'} \mid v' \in Post(v)\}) \quad \text{if } v \in V_V^{SG}$$

$$x_v = \min (\mathbf{U}, \min \{x_{v'} \mid v' \in Post(v)\}) \quad \text{if } v \in V_R^{SG} \setminus \{v_{err}\}$$

$$x_v = 0 \quad \text{if } v = v_{err}$$

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Uses equations on the symbolic game

The proof uses previous theorem and [CAV 2022]

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$$\inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m]$$

$$= \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,\mathcal{H}}^{MDf}} \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,\mathcal{H}}^{MD}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{H},v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m]$$

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$$= \sup_{\pi_V \in \Pi_{V,G}} \inf_{\pi_R \in \Pi_{R,G}^f} \mathbb{E}_{G,v}^{\pi_V, \pi_R} [f_m]$$

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Summary

- ❖ Contributions:
 - ❖ A stochastic game characterizing masking probabilistic simulation...
 - ❖ ...and its symbolic version on which the game can be decided
 - ❖ A notion of measure for masking fault tolerance through the stochastic game based on milestones and the resulting masking payoff function
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There is a prototype tool soon to be reported

If so, is the stochastic masking game also almost sure failing under fairness?

Quantifying Masking Fault-Tolerance via Fair Stochastic Games

Pablo F. Castro, **Pedro R. D'Argenio**, Ramiro Demasi, Luciano Putruele

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